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FOREIGN CORPORATION LAWS: THE LOSS
OF REASONI
WILLIAm LAURENS WALKER*
The author says that foreign corporation statutes were originally in-
tended to solve service of process problems that no longer exist, and
that the principle of conditional entry which sustained the statutes, is to-
day largely discredited. He asks: "'Should these troublesome regulatory
schemes now be enforced by the courts or conceded further life by the
legislatures?"
[T]he most universal and effectual way of discovering the true mean-
ing of a law, when the words are dubious, is by considering the reason
and spirit of it; or the cause which moved the legislator to enact it.
For when this reason ceases, the law itself ought likewise to cease with
it.
1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *61.
INTRODUCTION
The reason for foreign corporation laws has ceased. The trouble-
some qualification panoply of applications for admission, charter copies,
designated agents, contract defaults and the rest is now only a relic. The
search by practitioners and scholars for the chameleonic condition of doing
business is today more futile than ever before.
The error is nationwide. All states have general statutes, typically
major subparts of corporation codes, establishing terms and conditions
upon which corporations chartered by other states will be allowed to carry
on local business activities. The primary purpose of these fifty acts was
to solve problems created in the last century by a Federal Constitutional
requirement that original legal process be served within the territorial
boundaries of forum states. The conceptual basis of the laws was also a
product of an unusual nineteenth century development-the principle that
states can admit out-of-state corporations upon condition because, it was
said, they can exclude them entirely.
The original Constitutional problems are gone and the operating
t This is the first of two articles by the author on this topic to appear in Vol-
ume 47. Special thanks are due Professor Detlev F. Vagts of the Harvard Law
School for his comments and encouragement.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.
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principle of the laws is largely discredited. Yet this scheme surprisingly
not only survives, but as a result of recent corporation law revisions, has
been considerably complicated and extended.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN CORPORATION LAWS
The premise that foreign corporation laws were passed in response
to particular problems and were structured by a particular principle can be
tested by comparing the development and content of the problems and
principle with the development and content of the laws. Significant chro-
nological and substantive correlation is evidence that the premise is cor-
rect.
A. Territorial Idea of Law
Both the purpose and structure of foreign corporation laws grew
from the idea that law is limited by sovereign boundaries. The evolution,
acceptance, and eventual decline of this idea forms a historical pattern
much the same as that traced by the spread of foreign corporation acts.
1
The seven northern provinces of the Netherlands formed a federal
union in 1579 after a successful revolt against Spanish rule.2 But the
alliance did little to dampen the independence of each province and the
jealous protection of local rights. This spirit and a growing commerce
with foreign nations led to the promotion of a distinctly territorial notion
of law.' Chief among those responding to the needs of that time and
place was Ulrich Huber, professor of law at the University of Franeker.
In his treatise De Conflictu Legum Diversarum in Diversis Imperiis,
Huber asserted more effectively than any earlier scholar that law is lim-
ited by sovereign boundaries. He began his brief treatise by stating a
maxim which has had enduring influence:
(1) The laws of each state have force within the limits of that gov-
ernment and bind all subject to it, but not beyond.4
'See generally A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE
PROBLEMS 59-76 (1965) [hereinafter cited as VON MEHREN & TRAUTMAN].
216 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 266 (1968).
'Lorenzen, Huber's De Conflictu Legum, 13 ILL. L. REv. 375, 377 (1919);
see Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 AM. J. CoMP. L.
297 (1953).
'Lorenzen, supra note 3, at 403. The translation follows U. HUBER, PRAELEC-
TIONUM JURIS Civnris ToMi Tms (2d ed. 1707). The language quoted in the text
is followed by two additional maxims:
(2) All persons within the limits of a government, whether they live there
permanently or temporarily, are deemed to be subjects thereof....
(3) Sovereigns will so act by way of comity that rights acquired within
[Vol. 47
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Joseph Story fixed Huber's idea in American jurisprudence by in-
corporating it in his 1834 treatise, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws.
He wrote in the introduction "that the laws of one country can have no
intrinsic force, proprio vigore, except within the territorial limits and
jurisdiction of that country."5 Huber's notions were readily accepted
elsewhere. In Rose v. Himely6 Chief Justice Marshall said, "[T]he leg-
islation of every country is territorial . . . .-7 Nearly a century later
Justice Holmes in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.8 considered
"startling"9 the assertion that a treble damage action under the Sherman
Act could be maintained by an Alabama corporation against a New Jer-
sey corporation where the acts complained of occurred outside the United
States. Joseph H. Beale, in his treatise10 dedicated to Justice Story, wrote
as late as 1935 that "the law of a state prevails throughout its boundaries
and, generally speaking, not outside them."11
The doctrine was seriously questioned a number of years before pub-
lication of Professor Beale's treatise. In 1924 Walter Wheeler Cook
consisely stated the critics' case:
My conclusion then is, that while, so long as we have the territorial
organization of modem political society, the law of a given state or
country can be enforced only within its territorial limits ... this does
not mean that the law of that state or country cannot, except in cer-
tain exceptional cases, affect the legal relations of persons outside its
limits. As we have seen, "law" is not a material phenomenon which
spreads out like a light wave until it reaches the territorial boundary
and then stops.
12
Professor Cook was joined by his Yale colleague, Ernest G. Lorenzen,
who wrote on the centennial of Justice Story's Commentaries:
Serious issue may be taken with Story's territorial theory of Anglo-
American law. The assertion that "no state or nation can by its own
the limits of a government retain their force everywhere so far as they do
not cause prejudice to the power or rights of such government or of its
subjects.
Id.
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 7 (1st ed. 1834).
68 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241 (1808).
7Id. at 279.
- 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
Old. at 355.
0J. BEALE, CONFLICr OF LA-ws (1935).
1 Id. at 308.
12 Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J.
457, 484 (1924) (citation omitted).
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laws directly affect or bind ... persons not resident therein" is, to say
the least, misleading .... 1
The Cook-Lorenzen analysis, which has never been seriously challenged,
14
eventually influenced the courts 5 and led to significant changes in judicial
notions about the territorial reach of law. One result has been an erosion
of both the purpose' 6 and the conceptual foundation1 7 of foreign cor-
poration statutes.
B. Requirement of Service of Original Process Within Forum
Jurisdictions
In the last years of the eighteenth century, the courts of this country
took up the task of elaborating the recently established federal mechanism.
Questions developed concerning the effect of state action beyond terri-
torial boundaries, and courts very early considered the effect of delivery
of process outside forum states.
1. Early Nineteenth Century Statements
In Kibbe v. Kibbe"s a Massachusetts plaintiff brought an action in
Connecticut against a Connecticut defendant and relied entirely on a prior
judgment obtained against the defendant in Massachusetts. The defen-
dant pleaded that service of the original writ was attempted by leaving
a copy at his residence in Connecticut, that the Massachusetts judgment
was therefore void, and that the action could not be maintained. The
court agreed because "[i]t appears by the pleadings, that the defendant
was an inhabitant of the state of Connecticut, and was not within the juris-
diction of the Court of Common Pleas for the County of Berkshire, at
the time of the pretended service of the writ .... ""
" Lorenzen, Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws-One Hundred
Years After, 48 HARV. L. REv. 15, 37 (1934) (citation omitted). In a later article
Professor Cook specifically considered the territorial maxims of Justice Story and
concluded that by and large they "ought to be discarded." Cook, The Jurisdiction
of Sovereign States and the Conflict of Laws, 31 COLUm. L. Rnv. 368, 384 (1931).
" Brainerd Currie wrote in 1958 that the criticism by Professor Cook discred-
ited Professor Beale's statement of the idea "as thoroughly as the intellect of one
man can ever discredit the intellectual product of another." Currie, On the Dis-
placement of the Law of the Forum, 58 COLUm. L. Rxv. 964, 966 (1958). See A.
EH.ENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 5 (1962).
"8A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 14, § 5. The role of Chief Justice Stone was
particularly noteworthy. See Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of
Laws, 59 HARv. L. REv. 1210 (1946).
" See pp. 24-27 infra.
" See pp. 29-30 infia. The work of scholars has been emphasized in this brief
survey because of the strong impact of their views. See D. CAVERS, T3E Coicr
oF LAW PRocEss viii (1965).




The idea that delivery of original process within the jurisdiction is
necessary for unlimited general jurisdiction, 0 or at least necessary for
a judgment entitled to full faith and credit in another state, was further
developed in the 1809 New York case of Kilburn v. Woodworth.21 The
plaintiff brought an action against the New York defendant to enforce
a judgment secured in Massachusetts. The Massachusetts suit began by
attachment of a bedstead belonging to defendant and delivery of process
in Massachusetts to defendant's wife. Plaintiff's argument that such ac-
tion alone would support a judgment enforceable in New York was re-
jected because "[t]he defendant was not a resident of Massachusetts
when the suit was commenced; his domicile was in this State, and being
a person here, and not within the jurisdiction of the court of Massachu-
setts, he was not, and could not have been served with process." 22
The Kibbe and Kilburn cases indicate that early in the nineteenth
century there existed an idea that unlimited general jurisdiction required
physical delivery of process within forum states. The doctrine was not
universally accepted and, as apparent from the cases, was first articulated
where enforcement of an out-of-state judgment was asked as a matter of
full faith and credit. A number of states had very broad statutes pro-
viding for service by publication, 3 obviously enacted on the premise
that local delivery of process was unnecessary. Several state courts in
fact held that delivery of process in the jurisdiction was not required for
a valid local judgment.24 But a statement of the exact extent of the ser-
vice requirement as it existed in the early nineteenth century is unneces-
sary in order to understand the development of foreign corporation laws.
The cases show that lawyers and legislators of the time knew that ser-
vice of process within forum jurisdictions was often required if a judg-
ment were to be enforced out of state, which suggested that local service
might someday be generally required.
2 The terminology is that suggested in von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction
to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121 (1966).
" 5 Johns. 37 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809).
2 Id. at 41. The New York court relied heavily on a now famous English case
decided in 1808, Buchanan v. Rucker, 103 Eng. Rep. 546 (K.B. 1808).
" The early New York and California statutes are described in Ehrenzweig
& Mills, Personal Service Outside the State, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 384 (1953).
2" See the cases and authorities collected in Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule
of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE
L.J. 289, 307 n.127 (1956). At that time there was, of course, no federal due
process requirement imposed on the states and they were free to adopt judicial
procedures considered locally adequate.
1968]
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2. Nationwide Requirement of Due Process of Law
The development of this early scattered authority into a due process
requirement is a subject beyond the scope of this article. But a series
of four cases establishes the development and content of the requirement
chronologically and can be related to the adoption of early foreign cor-
poration laws.
In Bissell v. Briggs25 the New Hampshire plaintiff brought an action
in Massachusetts upon a judgment recovered in New Hampshire against
the Massachusetts defendant. Process in the original action was served
while defendants were personally present in New Hampshire. Never-
theless, Chief Justice Parsons posed the hypothetical case of a Massachu-
setts debtor not subject to service of process in New Hampshire, but
owning property there. The New Hampshire assets, the Chief Justice
said, would be subject to levy, but if the assets were insufficient "and the
creditor should sue an action on that judgment in this state to obtain
satisfaction he must fail; because the defendant was not personally amen-
able to the jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment."2 Bissell
played a direct role in the development of the due process requirement
through an unusual chain of events.
In Kane v. Cook27 the New York plaintiffs consigned goods for sale
to the California defendants. The defendants received the goods and sold
them, but did not pay the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sued in New York
and served the defendants under a New York statute establishing a broad-
ly-applicable procedure for service by publication. The plaintiffs secured
a judgment which was not paid, and sued in California on the same cause
of action. The defendants contended that the New York judgment barred
the California action, and the California Supreme Court was called upon
to determine the effect of the New York proceedings. The opinion by
Justice Stephen J. Field2 relied on Bissell, calling it the "leading case," 2
and held for a unanimous court that the prior judgment was not a bar
to the California action. The reason was that "the judgment in New
29 Mass. 462 (1813).
" Id. at 468. The Massachusetts court had little trouble finding on the actual
facts that since defendants had been served in New Hampshire they could not
impeach the prior judgment.
2 8 Cal. 449 (1857).
28 Stephen J. Field was elected to the Supreme Court of California on Septem-
ber 2, 1857. In the October term of 1857, his first term, he was assigned the
opinion in Kane v. Cook. Field was appointed by President Lincoln to the United
States Supreme Court and on March 10, 1863, his appointment was confirmed by
the Senate. 6 DICTIONARY OF AM RICAN BIOGRAPHY 372 (A. Johnson & D. Ma-
lone ed. 1931).
20 8 Cal. at 456.
[Vol. 47
FOREIGN CORPORATION LAWS
York... was rendered without personal service on the defendant, or his
appearance in the action. He was at the time in this State, and the Court
therefore had no jurisdiction of his person."30
Kane is significant largely because Justice Field dealt with the same
problem in writing the opinion for the United States Supreme Court in
Pennoyer v. Neff.3 1 In that case Neff sued in an Oregon federal court to
recover a tract of land located in that state, claiming title under a patent
of the United States. Pennoyer claimed under a sheriff's deed executed in
satisfaction of a judgment obtained against Neff in an Oregon state court.
Service of process in the original action was by publication, but Neff's real
property was not attached until sometime after the publication. The trial
court decided that there were defects in the affidavits relating to service in
the original action and found for Neff.32 The Supreme Court opinion be-
gan by stating that a majority felt that the affidavits satisfied the require-
ments of the Oregon statute. Rather than reverse, however, the Court de-
cided the threshold question of whether the service by publication was
sufficient to support the state judgment. Justice Field postulated that "the
laws of one State have no operation outside of its territory," and therefore
held that "no tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond
that territory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions." 3
Justice Field's opinion gave this conclusion sweeping application.
Service within forum states was held (1) a requirement for enforcement
of judgments under the full faith and credit clause, (2) a requirement
for recognition of state court judgments in federal courts, and (3) a
requirement of due process under the recently adopted fourteenth amend-
ment. 4 The Pennoyer decision is important here because the case re-
quired physical delivery of process within forum states as a Constitutional
prerequisite for unlimited general jurisdiction. Apparently Justice Field
realized that his opinion would create difficulties for local plaintiffs. He
wrote that the Court did not "mean to assert that a State may not re-
quire a non-resident entering into a partnership or association within its
30 Id.
f95 U.S. 714 (1878).
2 17 F. Cas. 1279 (No. 10,083) (C.C.D. Ore. 1875).
1 95 U.S. at 722.
" Excepted were cases involving property located within forum states. Id. at
723. Pennoyer was such a case, but because of failure to attach the property be-
fore publication, the Court treated the case as one not involving the stated excep-
tion. Also note that sweeping application of the doctrine was not required. At
issue only was recognition of the judgment in federal court. No other state was
involved and the original action was decided prior to the effective date of the
fourteenth amendment.
1968]
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limits, or making contracts enforceable there, to appoint an agent or rep-
resentative in the State to receive service of process ... ."8'
There was little doubt about the impact of Pennoyer on actions against
foreign corporations, but Justice Field spelled it out five years later in
St. Clair v. Cox."0 In considering the effect of a Michigan judgment ob-
tained against an Illinois corporation he reviewed the holding in Pen-
noyer and said that "the doctrine of that case applies, in all its force, to
personal judgments of State courts against foreign corporations.""7
As the jurisdictional problems multiplied and spread to every state as
a result of Pennoyer, plaintiffs and their lawyers no doubt asked for leg-
islative solutions. The problems were not limited to suits against foreign
corporations. Local plaintiffs with claims against out of state individuals,
partnerships, and other non-corporate organizations also had to serve
them in forum states. But where corporate defendants were involved, a
solution was at hand.
C. Principle of Conditional Entry
The underpinning of foreign corporation laws, like the problems dis-
cussed above, reaches back at least to the works of Huber and those who
followed him in describing law as strictly limited by sovereign boun-
daries."8 The Supreme Court's holding that a state may admit foreign
corporations upon condition was the result of a combination of this ter-
ritorial notion and the idea that corporations are fictional creatures of the
law of incorporating sovereigns.
In Head & Armory v. Providence Insurance Co.,89 the Supreme Court
held that an agreement to void an insurance policy was not effective be-
cause not executed by the corporate insurer in the manner specifically
required by its charter. In reaching this decision, Chief Justice Marshall
described the corporation as "the mere creature of the act to which it
owes its existence," deriving "all its powers from that act, and ... capable
of exerting its faculties only in the manner which that act authorizes."40
The Chief Justice restated this idea in Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
" Id. at 735. In his dissent Justice Hunt pointed out that the Oregon statute
involved was nearly identical to the service by publication provisions of the New
York Code of Civil Procedure. Id. at 738. The New York Code was largely de-
veloped by justice Field's older brother, David Dudley Field, and at a time when
the two were law partners in New York. 6 DICTIONARY or AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY,
supra note 28, at 361, 372. Did Pennoyer finally settle a kitchen table argument?
106 U.S. 350 (1882).27Id. at 353.
See pp. 2-4 supra.
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 127 (1804).
0Id. at 167.
[Vol. 47
19681 FOREIGN CORPORATION LAWS 9
Woodward,41 decided in 1819. One argument for upholding the New
Hampshire legislature's alteration of the college's charter was that Dart-
mouth had become by incorporation a public institution subject to change
by political process. In dismissing this contention Chief Justice Marshall
described a corporation as "an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and
existing only in contemplation of law."' These formulations established
the early viewpoint.
In the 1839 case of Bank of Augusta v. Earle,4 3 a Georgia corporation
sued to collect a bill of exchange made and sold in Alabama by the de-
fendant to the corporation's agent. The defendant argued that the con-
tract of purchase was void because the plaintiff, as a Georgia corporation,
could not act in Alabama. By this time, corporations were dealing ex-
tensively across state lines,4 4 and the case put in question the validity of
a large number of contracts. Despite this persuasive fact, a decision in
favor of the corporation was difficult to reach because of the territorial
and fiction ideas. How could creatures of state law act beyond the borders
of the states which created them? Chief Justice Taney accepted both
ideas and wrote for the Court that "a corporation can have no legal exis-
tence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created"
because "it exists only in contemplation of law, and by force of the law;
and where that law ceases to operate and is no longer obligatory, the
corporation can have no existence."45 But the Chief Justice found a
solution in the doctrine of comity and held that states are presumed, as
a purely "voluntary" 46 matter, to allow foreign corporations to make
and enforce local contracts. The Court also dealt with the argument that
the corporation was entitled to protection under the privileges and im-
munities clause of the Constitution and held that corporations were not
within the shelter of that provision. A contrary result would have radical-
ly changed-if not ended-the evolution of foreign corporation laws;
such a Constitutional holding would have eliminated further development
toward a principle of conditional entry. But the protection was denied
on terms not directly related to the presumption of voluntary admis-
sion, so there was little effect on the principle."
"117 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
,2 Id. at 636.
'338 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
"E. DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860, at 48 (1954).
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 588.
10 Id. at 589.
" For a discussion of the Federal Constitutional aspects of the case see G.
HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 57 (1918).
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The logic of Chief Justice Taney's comity was given its due in La-
fayette Insurance Co. v. French,4" decided in 1855. The Ohio plaintiffs
sued in Indiana to enforce an Ohio judgment against an Indiana corpo-
ration which maintained an agent in Ohio authorized to make contracts
of insurance. Original process in the Ohio action was served on the
agent in Ohio under a statute providing that service of process on a
resident insurance agent was "effectual as though the same were served
on the principal."49 In his opinion, Justice Curtis cited the Bank of Au-
gusta case and wrote that "a corporation created by Indiana can transact
business in Ohio only with the consent, express or implied, of the latter
State.""0 Then in a contribution of his own Justice Curtis said that "this
consent may be accompanied by such conditions as Ohio may think fit
to impose.""1 The Court held that the Ohio statute amounted to a con-
dition upon entry that bound the defendant. Justice Curtis's reasoning
was central to the establishment of foreign corporation laws.
The principle received its most decisive statement in Paul v. Vir-
ginia.2 The defendant was convicted in Virginia of issuing a policy of
insurance as agent of an out-of-state insurance corporation which had
been denied a license by Virginia for failure to post a security bond. The
Court found the statute valid because the corporation was not a "citizen"
within the meaning of the privileges and immunities clause, and because
insurance was not "commerce" within the meaning of the commerce
clause. In support of the first of these two holdings the Court followed
the logic of Lafayette and concluded that states "may exclude the foreign
corporation entirely" 5R-thus sanctioning the ultimate condition.
D. Original Foreign Corporation Laws
All fifty states"4 adopted their first foreign corporation laws during
4859 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855).
Law of Jan. 21, 1847, § 3, 45 Ohio Laws 17. The concept of the act was
similar to an earlier Maryland statute, which provided that foreign insurance com-
panies could be held liable to local suit arising out of Maryland transactions, and
that service could be made "upon any agent of the company." Law of Feb. 23,
1835, ch. 89 [1834] Md. Laws (not paginated). For a discussion of the Maryland
act see E. DODD, supra note 44, at 174. Neither statute required the presence of
an agent-but only provided that service could be made upon an agent if found in
the state." 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 407.
" Id.
" 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869). The opinion was written by Justice Field
which may explain his specific suggestion in Pennoyer of the conditional entry
technique. See pp. 7-8 supra.
"' Id. at 181. The Constitutional aspects of the case are discussed in detail in
HENDERSON, supra note 47, at 64, 104.
"' No distinction is made here or elsewhere where the original act was passed
(Vol. 47
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the period 1852-1946. The premise that problems of service of process
and the principle of conditional entry combined to produce foreign corpo-
ration laws can be tested by comparing the historical data discussed thus
far with the chronological and substantive pattern of these first statutes.
Before examiriing the pattern in detail several cautions are appropri-
ate. An attempt to determine for every state just when its first law was
adopted involves a judgment as to what is a foreign corporation law. In
other words, what statutes are antecedent to the fifty states statutes cur-
rently in effect? Two particular requirements, designation of local agents
and filing copies of corporate charters, appear in a substantial majority
of today's laws, so early statutes including either of these two require-
ments are here considered significantly related to the current acts. Nine-
teenth century state legislation is poorly indexed and identification of
first statutes in particular cases is subject to error. But the materials are
sufficiently reliable to permit conclusions to be drawn from the general
pattern.
1. Chronology
The first generally applicable foreign corporation law was enacted by
Indiana in 1852."" The most recent was adopted by the Georgia General
Assembly in 194656---so recently that it is sometimes referred to as a long
arm statute,5" though its substance and applications clearly show other-
wise. ' 8 The Georgia law was adopted thirty-three years after the forty-
by a territorial legislature. Where an original statute was passed before division
of a territory into two states, as in the case of Dakota's division into North Dakota
and South Dakota, the date of the original territorial law has been used for both
the resulting states. The growth of the laws was unique in all states, but only one
original act was proclaimed by a King-Kalakaua of Hawaii. Law of July 3, 1878
[1878] Hawaii Laws 11.
These statutes apparently grew from native soil and did not result from prior
British practice. Until 1907 there was no statutory scheme in Great Britain for
dealing with companies incorporated outside that country. PALMER'S COMPANY
PRECEDENTS 1161 (17th ed. R. Buchanan-Dunlap 1956). The Companies Act of
1907, 7 Edw. 7, ch. 50, § 35 established a set of requirements including filing of
charter copies, designated agents, annual reports and other provisions similar to
those at that time already in effect in some states, suggesting the possibility that
foreign corporation laws were imported, not exported, by Great Britain. The
present practice is governed by the Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38,
part X. The Companies Act of 1967, c. 81 left the overseas companies provisions of
the 1948 Act in force with no material change. The 1967 Act was not a compre-
hensive revision, but a series of amendments to the 1948 Act. See Leigh, Comn-
panies Act 1967, 31 MOD. L. REv. 183 (1968).
" Law of June 17, 1852, printed at 1 IND. REv. STAT. 242-43 (1852).
" Law of Jan. 31, 1946, no. 586 [1946] Ga. Laws 687. The Georgia law is
omitted from the graph on p. 13 for the reasons stated in the text.
" PRENTICE HALL, LAwYER'S WEEKLY REPORT § 3 (October 23, 1967).
8 Buckhead Doctor's Bldg., Inc. v. Oxford Finance Cos., 115 Ga. App. 52, 153
19681
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ninth act, the New Hampshire statute of 1913,51 and it is fair to call the
Georgia enactment aberrational. The period 1852-1913 more accurately
suggests the time during which first foreign corporations acts became law.
Paul v. Virginia0 made plain the potential of conditional entry, and
Pennoyer v. Neff1 made nationwide the requirement that original process
be served within forum jurisdictions. The adoption of first statutes should
be considered in chronological relation to the dates of those decisions,
November 1, 1869 and January 21, 1878. The pattern of adoption may
be related to Paul and Pennoyer as shown in the graph on page 13.
The fact that some laws were enacted before Paul is not surprising in
light of the historical data that shows the development of the conditional
entry principle as early as 1839. Similarly, the fact that a few laws were
adopted before Pennoyer is not surprising because of the data that shows
the requirement of service within the jurisdiction had been germinating
for more than 75 years before that decision. Discounting four early acts
that did not respond to jurisdictional problems, " the number of states
adopting statutes before Pennoyer probably represents in a rough way
the extent of the service requirement before it became a matter of due
process in 1878.
The apparent hesitancy and then rapid increase in the number of stat-
utes after Pennoyer is to be expected. A typical pattern in state legislation
is an early testing period, then widespread enactment in follow-the-leader
style. The fact that the greatest period of activity came ten years after
Pennoyer does not show unresponsiveness. A ten-year lag is short as
such matters usually develop. Long arm statutes, for example, represent
a response to the 1945 Supreme Court decision in International Shoe Co.
v. Washington,"3 but more than 15 years passed before they were adopted
by more than a handful of states. 4 From the standpoint of time, then,
there is significant correlation between the problems, the principle and
the laws.
2. Content
The three earliest acts are worth detailed consideration: the Indiana
S.E.2d 650 (1967) (application for certiorari was denied by the Georgia Supreme
Court on Mar. 9, 1967).
Law of May 21, 1913, ch. 187 [1913] N.H. Laws 748.
°75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).
0195 U.S. 714 (1877).
02 See p. 16 infra.
01326 U.S. 310 (1945).
"See D. Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended
Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 537. Major growth in the field has
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statute 5 shows the first development of the central requirement that a
local agent be appointed; the New York law 6 shows the transition from
a special to a general legislative remedy; and the Arizona statuteT is a
prototype of present laws.
The first generally applicable foreign corporation law in the United
States was enacted June 17, 1852, by the Indiana General Assembly.
6"
The brief statute required agents of corporations "not incorporated or
organized in this State" to file with the clerk of court, in the county where
"they propose doing business," a copy of the authorization under which
they act for the corporation,69 and written authority from the corporation
" Law of June 17, 1852, ch. 25, printed at 1 IND. REv. STAT. 242 (1852).
" Law of April 10, 1855, ch. 279, [1855] N.Y. Laws 470.
Law of Nov. 6, 1866, § 23-27, [1866] Ariz. Laws 38.
"Law of June 17, 1852, printed at 1 IND. Rnv. STAT. 242 (1852).
ODId. § 1.
0 r-
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for the agent to accept service of process in any action "arising out of any
transaction in this State with such agents."70 Noncomplying corporations
were barred in Indiana from enforcing contracts made by local agents,
who were subject to a fine of not less than fifty dollars for making the
contracts. The general requirement that an agent be designated to accept
service of process was an early reaction to the ideas that led to Penioy-
er. The requirement that an agent file proof of authority was dropped in
later statutes, probably as doctrines developed to better protect persons
dealing with agents. The penalty for noncompliance was the same often
found in current laws. No doubt, it was a product of a rough justice idea
that corporations should not be allowed to appear locally as plaintiffs if not
accessible as defendants.
In 1855 New York adopted a statute entitled "An Act to facilitate
the service of process on Insurance and other corporations doing business
in this state."7  The act required corporations "created by the laws of
any other state" to designate an agent for service of process in each coun-
ty in which it transacted business. 2 The law further provided that where
the designation was not made, service might be had upon "any person
who shall be found within this state acting as the agent of said corpora-
tion."" The New York statute was transitional. Its application to in-
surance and "other" corporations points to the fact that general foreign
corporation statutes were sometimes successors to acts applicable only
to specific types of business, often insurance.74 The requirement of desig-
nation of an agent was included, but the penalty for noncompliance was
the same as the primary procedure set up by the Ohio statute,, involved
in the Lafayette case. Such statutes, allowing service on specified agents
if found in the jurisdiction, were common, though not effective to solve
the Pennoyer problem. The New York act requiring designation shows
progress from those earlier statutes toward a solution.
Both the early Indiana and New York acts were far different from
current laws. The 1866 Arizona statute,"0 on the other hand, was very
similar to modem acts. The 1866 law was applicable to "any Company
701d. § 2." Law of April 10, 1855, ch. 279, [1855] N.Y. Laws 470.
7 Id. § 1.
"Id. § 2.
""E.g., Law of Feb. 23, 1835, ch. 89, [1835] Md. Laws (not paginated); Law
of Jan. 21, 1847, 45 Ohio Laws 17.
" Law of Jan. 21, 1847, 45 Ohio Laws 17.
"Law of Nov. 6, 1866, § 23-27, [1866] Ariz. Laws 33.
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incorporated under the laws of any other State or Territory" 77 carrying
on business in Arizona and replaced a less sophisticated statute, 8 passed
in 1864, applicable only to mining corporations. The Arizona act re-
quired corporations to file certified copies of their charters with the secre-
tary of the territory and be locally represented by agents "who shall reside
within the limits and under the jurisdiction of this Territory."79 Upon
compliance, out-of-state corporations were granted privileges allowed by
the general corporation act, and "held liable and responsible to all its
provisions"8 to the same extent as domestic corporations. Noncomply-
ing corporations were liable to "forfeit all their rights, interests, claims
and demands within this Territory.""1 These requirements include most
common provisions of current statutes.
s2
Development following these earliest statutes occurred in three phases.
In a typical state there was legislative activity relating to foreign corpo-
rations which predated the first general foreign corporation act. These
statutes often provided for attachment of local property belonging to out-
of-state corporations,8 3 or made grants to foreign corporations of specific
local powers, often the power to hold real estate.8" The second phase be-
gan with the adoption of general statutes similar to the Arizona law.85
Then came a third period in which the laws were perfected by the addition
of numerous administrative provisions, particularly requirements intended
to keep current information initially filed.
In some instances a statutory or administrative relation between for-
eign corporation acts and state tax programs developed, and information
used to assess certain taxes was required.8 6 This connection between the
17 Id. § 23.
'Law of Nov. 10, 1864, ch. 11, §§ 38-42, printed at HOWELL CODE 412-13
(1864). The statute applied to "any company for mining purposes incorporated
under the laws of any other State or Territory." Id. § 38.
"' Law of Nov. 6, 1866, § 23, [1866] Ariz. Laws 33.
"0Id.
'Id. § 24.
See pp. 19-22 infra.
'E.g., Part 3, ch. VIII, tit. IV, art. 1, §§ 15-30, N.Y. REv. STAT. (1827 &
1828). The Revision was adopted piecemeal by the New York legislature, then
ordered published as a whole. Materials available in the Harvard Law School Li-
brary do not show the date of enactment of Part 3, hence the citation to the Re-
vision as ordered published. In any case, this will be the most convenient source
for further reference.
" E.g., Law of April 9, 1875, [1875] Ill. Laws 65; Law of March 28, 1873, ch.
CCCCVII, [1873] N.J. Laws 76.
"See p. 13 supra.
"See 3 SPECIAL SUBCO~M. ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE OF
THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R.
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laws and tax programs was a comparatively late innovation. None of
the early acts asked for information typically required to determine taxes.
In six states the content developed somewhat differently and the
variation in this minority shows a secondary need met by many of the
laws. Nevada and Wyoming adopted primitive statutess 7 in 1869, which
required out-of-state corporations to file copies of their charters with spe-
cified officials before transacting local business. In contrast with the first
acts of the great majority of states, neither Nevada nor Wyoming re-
quired designation of a local agent. Four other states-Florida, Montana,
Tennessee, and Texas-initially omitted a local agent provision.8  The
Nevada, Wyoming, Montana and Tennessee statutes were adopted before
Pennoyer and the omissions probably can be explained on that basis.
There are no apparent reasons for the omissions by Texas in 1889 and
by Florida in 1907, but few legislatures enact perfect statutes even with
good examples handy, and it is not unreasonable to assume oversights.
All six states did, however, include requirements that charter copies be
filed locally, suggesting a need other than that defined by Pennoyer.
The most likely explanation for these provisions is found as early as
the 1859 decision of the Supreme Court in Pearce v. Madison & Indianap-
olis Railroad Co.89 The plaintiff sued two Indiana corporations in an
Indiana federal court to enforce five $1,000 promissory notes executed
by the corporations. The trial court held that the execution of the notes
had been an ultra vires act and therefore the notes could not be enforced.
The Supreme Court affirmed and said that "persons dealing with the
managers of a corporation must take notice of the limitations imposed
upon their authority by the act of incorporation."9 This strict view of
ultra vires was carried forward by the federal courts. No doubt it was
brought sharply to -the attention of the bar by Central Transportation Co.
REP. No. 585, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 925 (1965) [hereinafter cited as SP CrAL
Sucomm. REPORT].
" Law of March 3, 1869, ch. LXVII, [1869] Nev. Stat. 115; Law of Dec. 10,
1869, ch. 8, art. IV, [1869] Wyo. Laws 264.
"Law of June 1, 1907, ch. 5717, no. 122 [1907] Fla. Laws 230; Law of June
12, 1872, [1872] Mont. Laws 419; Law of March 19, 1877, ch. XXXI, [1877]
Tenn. Acts 44, made generally applicable by Law of March 21, 1891, ch. 122,
[1891] Tenn. Acts 264; Law of April 2, 1887, ch. 128, [1887] Tex. Laws 116.
All six states eventually added an agent requirement. E.g., Law of Dec. 12, 1929,
ch. 13, § 3, [1929] Tenn. Acts Ex. Sess. 21.
"'62 U.S. (21 How.) 441 (1859).
9 Id. at 443. Though local defendant corporations were involved here, the
rule announced was equally applicable when the residence of the parties was re-
versed-the possible application which no doubt created local concern.
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v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 1 in which the Supreme Court held that all
contracts made by a corporation beyond the scope of its powers are "un-
lawful and void, and no action can be maintained upon them in the
courts.""2 Those statutes which required copies of foreign charters prob-
ably included the requirement in an attempt to lessen by disclosure the
dangers pointed out and in part created by Pearce and Central Transpor-
tation. Requirements that copies of charters be filed are weak remedies
compared with the remedies created for Pennoyer problems. In the for-
mer only information is provided; in the latter, agents for service.
3. Contemporary Opinion
The chronological pattern of enactment of the original statutes and
their content support the premise that the original laws were adopted to
solve service problems by conditioning entry upon the appointment of a
local agent. No legislative history bearing on these conclusions exists,
but there was some contemporary writing on the subject by scholars and
judges. This material is both a source of knowledge and an appropriate
test for conclusions suggested by historical analysis.
Frank Loughran, an early law review contributor, wrote about for-
eign corporation laws in 1895, and said:
These statutes, while presenting a general similarity of purpose and
method, disclose a wide variety of detail. It is not proposed to enter
into a minute analysis of these laws, or to consider their distinction
and variations from each other, but to examine the general principles
upon which such legislation is based .... The purpose of these statutes
is not to withdraw all comity, but to require the corporations to take a
position where its own contracts can be enforced against it in the local
courts.
93
Professor Beale in his book Foreign Corporations," published in
1904, described foreign corporation laws as follows:
"1 139 U.S. 24 (1891).
" Id. at 48. Such a federal rule of law was of great significance in the pre-
Erie period when foreign corporations could invoke the diversity jurisdiction of
the federal courts and make use of such a rule of "general commercial law." See
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
" Loughran, How Jurisdiction May Be Acquired in A State Court Over a
Foreign Corporation, and What is the Effect of a Judgment Rendered Against
Such a Corporation by Default, 41 CENT. L.J. 247, 250 (1895).
1J J. BEALE, FOREIGN CORPORATIONS (1904).
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Statutory regulations of the business of a foreign corporation are di-
rected, generally speaking, to secure the rights of domestic creditors,
stockholders or others dealing with the corporations. The earliest need
of regulation felt by the States was some provision by which it might
be possible for a creditor to bring suit against a corporation. This was
accomplished by a provision requiring a foreign corporation to appoint
an agent within the state authorized to accept service of process; and
such a provision has been adopted in every state.95
In Utley v. Clark-Gardner Lode Mining Co.,9" decided in 1878, a
New York corporation brought an action in Colorado in defense of cer-
tain mining rights. The defendants filed a special plea alleging that the
corporation had not complied with the requirements of the Colorado for-
eign corporation act9d 7 and therefore could not bring the action in Colo-
rado-though the statute did not specifically include such a penalty. The
Colorado Supreme Court held that local courts were not closed to non-
complying corporations by any implication of the law and in so doing
described the substance and purpose of the Colorado act as follows:
They shall designate, in a manner prescribed, their principal place of
business and an agent or agents residing thereat, upon whom process
may be served. In substance, they shall put themselves in a position to
be amenable to the process of the State courts. Similar statutes exist
in most of the States of the Union, the object being to protect the
citizens of the State, dealing with foreign corporations, from the hard-
ship of pursuing their rights in distant jurisdictions.9
A similar opinion was expressed in Groel v. United Electric Co., 9 where
a stockholder derivative action was brought by a New Jersey resident on
behalf of a New Jersey corporation against a Pennsylvania corporation.
Service on the Pennsylvania corporation was made in New Jersey upon
a resident of that state designated as defendant's local agent pursuant to
the New Jersey foreign corporation law.10 The defendant corporation
contended that it no longer transacted business in New Jersey, had re-
voked the commission of its local agent, and was not subject to service
5 Id. at 185-86. Professor Beale's assertion that an agent designation provision
"had been adopted in every state" was not accurate as of 1904, and his own detailed
explanation of the state laws proves that inaccuracy. See, e.g., id. at 209 (Georgia);
id. at 257 (New Hampshire).
4 Colo. 369 (1878).
"Law of March 14, 1877, § 23, printed at CoLo. GEx. LAws 151 (1877).
4 Colo. at 371.
69 N.J. Eq. 397, 60 A. 822 (Ch. 1905).
'"Law of May 15, 1894, ch. CCXXVIII, [1894] N.J. Laws 346.
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as attempted. The New Jersey Court held that the service was sufficient,
and in reaching this decision made a thorough analysis of the purpose of
the New Jersey act:
Foreign corporations, before the enactment of this legislation, could,
as we have seen, come within the State of New Jersey and, unless ser-
vice had been made upon some actual representative thereof while the
corporation was actually doing business in the state, they were free to
withdraw from the state and cause citizens who had transacted business
with them here to pursue them to their -home jurisdictions at great in-
convenience and expense .... The act of 1894, therefore, was enacted
to remedy this obvious evil. By its provisions, foreign corporations
could not lawfully transact business in this state without designating
an agent upon whom process might be served.101
II. CONTENT OF PRESENT LAWS
The problem of describing statutes now in force is the problem of
making a useful general statement about fifty statutes, each different from
the other. A comprehensive list of possible requirements was made, and
the fifty acts surveyed to determine which requirements are incorporated
in particular statutes. The profile which follows was drawn from pro-
visions found in at least a majority of the laws. But a picture of current
statutes cannot show the probable direction of change. The foreign corpo-
ration provisions of the ABA-ALI Model Business Corporation Act,
102
which are serving as a guide for new legislation, are included in this sec-
tion to indicate the direction of that development.
A. Pro file of Statutes
Current foreign corporation laws describe their scopes in terms of
corporation-state contacts. Scope phrases define the levels of contact
which will bring foreign corporations within the reach of the statutes.
Typically the term of art is "doing business,"' 03 though some states use
the phrase "transact business,"'' 4 and several include "hold property"'
0 5
10169 N.J. Eq. at 414, 60 A. at 628.
"' ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT §§ 99-119, 121, 124, 126, 128-30, (1953).
For the impact of the Model Act and a Survey of recent developments, see Folk,
Corporation Statutes: 1959-1966, 1966 DUKE L.J. 875, and 2 MODEL Bus. CORP.
AcT. ANN. 178 (Supp. 1966). Earlier developments are discussed in Symposium:
The New Look in Corporation Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 175-398 (1958)."'0 E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-1201 (1947) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1506 (1966)."' E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.597 (1962); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-1
(1963).
..E.g., S.D. CODE § 11.2002 (1939).
1968]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
located in the state. Most research in the field has been devoted to deter-
mining the content of these scope phrases, 10 though in truth there is little
to be said except that it is difficult-if not impossible-to determine the
application of particular statutes. Whatever the phrase, the scheme has
resulted in countless law suits and given rise -to a nonsensical body of case
law. The mass of precedent turned out over a hundred years of confusion
can support or defeat almost any claim.
Applications for admission require certain information, largely dupli-
cated by other specific requirements. Most states require formal state-
ments of name and jurisdiction of incorporation. 10 7 Some require de-
scriptions of proposed local business activities. 08 Most require that ad-
dresses of principal offices 09 and of local offices and agents ° be given.
In addition, a number of states require the names and addresses of corpo-
rate officers and directors."'
All states require that out-of-state corporations name local residents
to act as their agents to accept original process. In most cases these agents
may be individuals or corporations, but in several states the choice is
limited to public officials.' Designation requirements are typically ac-
companied by two supplementary provisions designed to eliminate service
problems. Most states provide that if designated agents cannot be found
after a reasonable effort, foreign corporations that have complied with
the laws will be taken to have designated specified public officials as their
agents ."3 Many of these statutes apply a similar presumption to corpora-
tions that have certain contacts with states but have failed to comply with
... E.g., Cavin, Doing Business As Applied to Foreign Corporations, 11 TEMP.
L.Q. 46 (1931); Issac, An Analysis of Doing Business, 25 CoLuM. L. REv. 1018
(1925); Keane & Collins, Changing Concepts of What Constitutes Doing Business
By Foreign Corporations, 42 MARQ. L. REV. 151 (1958); Roberts, What Consli-
tutes "Doing Business" By a Foreign Corporation In Kentucky, 31 Ky. L.J. 1
(1942). The chef d'oeuvre is published by the Corporation Trust Company. See
CORPORATION TRUST COMPANY, WHAT CONSTITUTES DOING BUSINESS (1965).
""7 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-399 (Supp. 1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
32, § 157.106 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
18E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.615 (1962); KAN. Gm. STAT. ANN. § 17-501
(1964).
... E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.107 (1962); Micir. STAT. ANN. § 21.94
(1963).
"'E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.106 (Smith-Hurd 1964); Onio REV.
CODE ANN. § 1703.04 (Page 1964).
... E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.615 (1962); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.107
(1962).
. E.g., MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 181, § 3 (Supp. 1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§2004 (1967); VT. STAT. tit. 11, § 692 (1959).




the statutes.'1 4 Where these provisions are included, the problems of
finding local corporate representatives are eliminated.
A substantial majority of states require that out-of-state corporations
file copies of their charters or articles of incorporation with public offi-
cials." At least one requires that charters be published locally," 6 and
another requires that copies of corporations' bylaws also be filed.1 7 Pre-
sumably these documents are subject to some degree of official inspection
and are available to the public. In support of this requirement, a majority
of the states specify that copies of subsequent charter amendments be
filed.:" s
Statutes typically provide that out-of-state corporations will not be
admitted to do business locally if their names are the same as, or decep-
tively similar to, the names of domestic corporations." 9 Grants of general
power to act locally in the same manner as domestic corporations are
usually made, but stated as contingent upon compliance with all statutory
requirements.' 2 ° A few states include specific powers, such as the capacity
to hold local real property.'" A substantial majority of the states provide
that foreign corporations complying with their statutes are generally sub-
ject to local law. Usually the provisions are stated in relation to domestic
corporations, as "subject to the same duties, restrictions, penalties, and
liabilities now or hereafter imposed upon a domestic corporation of like
charter."' 2 2 A few states include some element of selectivity,'23 but usual-
ly there is only unqualified authority to apply local law where there is
compliance.
"'E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1508 (1966). Strangely, the Model Act does not
include such a provision and states adopting the act have added appropriate lan-
guage where the omission has been noticed. See 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN.
196 (Supp. 1966).
"E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 10, §21(90) (Supp. 1967); Aniz. REv. STAT. ANN. §
10-481 (Supp. 1967).
"'Agiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-481 (Supp. 1967).
IHAWAII REV. LAws § 174-1 (Supp. 1965).
"'E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 342 (1953) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.112
(Smith-Hurd 1954).I" E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 613.08 (1956); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.809 (1957).
"'E.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 32, § 157.103 (Smith-Hurd 1954); IowA CODE
ANN. § 496A.104 (1962).
"E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 32, § 33-397 (1958). Georgia limits land
holding by foreign corporations to 5,000 acres each. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1504
(1966). Indiana generally prohibits local ownership of real property by foreign
corporations, though there are certain exceptions. IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-302
(Supp. 1967). Apparently these prohibitions are only xenophobic.
I' ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.103 (Smith-Hurd 1954). For other examples
see CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-4 (1963) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2010 (1967).
12* E.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP,. LAW §§ 1319-20 (McKinney 1963).
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A number of housekeeping provisions are often included. Many
states require annual reports designed primarily to keep information
initially filed up-to-date. 4 In states where foreign corporation laws play
a role in tax programs, annual reports provide information used
to assess tax liabilities. 5 One or two states require current financial
data' 6-- but this is a limited practice. Most states provide methods for
withdrawal.2'2 Typically included are formal requirements designed to
show that local obligations have been discharged and to provide for
local service of process for a specified period after withdrawal. Finally,
many statutes include mechanisms for revoking admissions. 2 Specified
grounds usually include failure to appoint agents, file annual reports, or
pay fees and franchise taxes, and misrepresentation of material informa-
tion.129
All states fix some penalty for noncompliance. Most common are
provisions that noncomplying corporations may not sue in local courts180
-which the Supreme Court has held also bars the corporations from
bringing actions in local federal courts.' In most states subsequent com-
pliance will open local courts to the corporations, even for claims arising
... E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-406 (1958); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-24.1
(Supp. 1967)."'E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, §157.115 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967), which
includes a page or more of reporting requirements and then adds '[S]uch addi-
tional information as may be necessary or appropriate ... to . . assess the prop-
er amount of fees and franchise taxes payable by such foreign corporation."
12 E.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 181, § 12 (Supp. 1967). This requirement
of a "certificate of condition" is elsewhere limited in scope. See MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 156, § 49 (Supp. 1967).
127 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 352 (1953; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2015
(1967).
"'E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.675 (1962) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.122
(Smith-Hurd 1954).
1229 Some states attempt to further otherwise unrelated policies by threat of
revocation. Alaska provides for revocation when corporations are "party to an
illegal combination in restraint of trade." ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.675 (1962). Il-
linois by recent amendment provides for revocation for wilfull violation of the
Illinois consumer fraud act. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.122a (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1967).
"'E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 613.04 (1956); S.C. CODE § 12-23.15 (Supp. 1967).
The extreme case is presented by the statutes of Nevada and Wisconsin which
also prohibit defense of a local action. NEv. REv. STAT. § 80.210 (1967); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 180-847 (1957). Application of the Nevada statute was denied in
Scott v. Day-Bristol Consol. Mining Co., 37 Nev. 299, 142 P. 625 (1914), where
the plaintiff successfully moved in the trial court to strike the defendant's demur-
rer on the ground that it could not defend the law suit, then took a default judg-
ment on the theory that the defendant could never answer.
"I Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949). This decision closed
an important avenue of relief and sharply increased the impact of door-closing
penalties. The Woods case will be the subject of a later article by the author.
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before compliance. But in a number of states subsequent qualification is
not retroactive in effect, and contracts made before admission remain lo-
cally unenforceable."3 2 This gives immunity from suit to local defendants
who cannot be brought to court in other states. Fines are typically in-
cluded in penalty provisions. They range from the amount of accrued
fees and taxes plus a small fee for late paymente't to as much as 10,000
dollars.'8 4 There is an occasional provision for fine or imprisonment of
officers and agents of offending corporations. It is possible for a corporate
officer to spend twelve months in an Alabama county jail for misjudg-
ment of the state's requirements 33-- a possibility that no doubt encourages
preventive compliance.
B. The Model Act
The foreign corporation sections of the ABA-ALI Model Business
Corporation Act 3 6 are now the pattern for new legislation. More than
twenty states have adopted its requirements or generally similar laws.
3 7
The Model Act provisions include all of the features of the profile plus
many others and constitute the most comprehensive foreign corporation law
yet drafted. For example, the Act attempts to reduce scope problems by
defining a number of activities that do not constitute transacting busi-
ness.""m The objective is good, but increased specificity rarely solves such
problems. The Act requires considerable data about capital structure
including a statement of the number of authorized shares, number of
issued shares, and stated capital.3 9 This information is needed primarily
for purposes of assessing a franchise tax, which the Model Act ties di-
rectly to foreign corporation requirements by imposing the tax on "each
foreign corporation authorized to transact business in this State."' 40 In
addition to the usual filing of charter copies, the Act requires filing of
"2 E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 10, § 21(89) (Supp. 1968); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §
10-482 (1956); AKic. STAT. ANN. § 64-1202 (1947); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-504
(1948); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 21.96 (1963); Miss. CODE ANN. § 5309-239 (1956);
S.D. CODE § 11.2103 (1939); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 764 (1958). In Tennessee,
noncomplying corporations are barred by court decision. United Artist Corp. v.
Board of Censors, 189 Tenn. 397, 225 S.W.2d 550 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
952 (1950). The opinion does not indicate that subsequent compliance would cure
the defect, but there is no holding in Tennessee on that issue.
"' ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.125 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
... IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-314 (1948)."'ALA. CODE tit. 10, § 21 (94) (Supp. 1965).
"'ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRe. AcT §§ 99-119, 121, 124, 126, 128-30 (1953).
2 MODEL Bus. CoR-P. AcT ANN. 178 (Supp. 1966).
"'ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. AcT § 99 (1953).
"'Id. § 103.10Id. § 126.
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articles of merger involving corporations admitted to do local business."'
A formal procedure is included for change of local registered offices and
agents,'42 and the mechanics of both withdrawal 4 ' and revocation 144 are
complex. The basic structure of the profile is found in the Model Act, but
the mechanism is perfected and extended, and the result is a formidable
regulatory statute.
III. ELIMINATION OF THE REQUIREMENT OF SERVICE
WITHIN FORUMS
The Pennoyer decision mistakenly fused two issues: whether a suffi-
cient relationship exists or existed between a particular defendant and the
forum to allow adjudication of claims against him and whether the de-
fendant received sufficient notice of the action. The court in Pennoyer
should have asked whether there was reason to require -the non-resident
to defend the claim against him in Oregon and whether publication of
the original process gave adequate notice. The court failed to make this
two-step analysis and instead asked only whether the defendant was
served with process while present in Oregon.
A. Suggestion That Service Within Forums Is Not Necessary
The 1917 case of McDonald v. Mabee 45 was an action on a note
brought in a Texas court. The only defense was that the plaintiff had
recovered a prior judgment on the note. The Supreme Court held the
prior judgment invalid because the service, which had been made by
publication, was not effective upon the particular facts. In reaching this
result Justice Holmes did not fully accept Pennoyer, but wrote that "to
dispense with personal service the substitute that is most likely to reach
the defendant is the least that ought to be required if substantial justice
is to be done."' 48
Justice Holmes' suggestion was for a long time ignored. In 1927 the
Supreme Court decided Hess v. Pawloski,14 7 which was an action brought
against a non-resident motorist in the Massachusetts courts. Service of
process was made upon the Massachusetts registrar of motor vehicles,
l'41 1d. § 110.
24
2 Id. § 107.
I's Id. §§112-13.
21Id. §§ 114-15.
'.243 U.S. 90 (1917).
140 Id. at 92.
'7 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
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pursuant to a Massachusetts statute,14 which provided that non-residents
who used the state's highways were deemed to appoint the registrar as
their agent for service of process. The Supreme Court held that service
on the registrar was sufficient and adopted without question the unitary
analysis of Pennoyer. According to the Court, "there must be actual
service within the state of notice upon him or upon someone authorized
to accept service for him."' 49
B. The Two-Factor Analysis
The turning point came in 1940 in Milliken v. Meyer. 5 ° Meyer
sued Milliken in a Colorado court and asked that a Wyoming judgment
obtained by Milliken against him be declared void. Meyer's claim was
based on the contention that the Wyoming court lacked jurisdiction in
the prior action. The Colorado trial court found that Meyer was domiciled
in Wyoming when the prior action began and that service was attempted
under a Wyoming statute' 5 ' by handing the original process to Meyer in
Colorado. The trial court held that the service was sufficient, and dis-
missed the action. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed,'52 but did not
consider the jurisdictional issue because it found error in the decree of
the Wyoming court.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the state court, holding
first that the issue considered by the Colorado court was not open to it
under the full faith and credit clause, and second that the Wyoming
judgment was valid. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Douglas used
a two-factor analysis. First, he asked whether Meyer had a sufficient
relationship with the state of Wyoming to be required to defend Milli-
ken's claim in that state and held that "domicile in -the state is alone
sufficient to bring an absent defendant within the reach of the state's
jurisdiction for purposes of a personal judgment by means of appropriate
" Law of May 22, 1923, ch. 431, [1923] Mass. Acts & Res. 438.
19 274 U.S. at 355. The Pawioski case is also of interest, because the concept
of the statute there involved was borrowed from that of foreign corporation laws.
The decision to allow application of the Massachusetts statute was difficult, for, as
Justice Holmes made clear in Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919), there was
no general principle as to individuals comparable to the principle of conditional
entry. See pp. 7-10 su pra. In Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916), the
Court upheld a requirement of actual appointment of a local agent by a non-resi-
dent motorist, though it did not consider the problem that Justice Holmes made
clear three years later in Flexner. The Court in Pawloski, with considerable re-
liance on Kane and the practicalities involved-and not much attention to the
strict demands of logic-upheld the Massachusetts act without resolving the con-
ceptual difficulty.
150311 U.S. 457 (1941).
Law of Feb. 25, 1915, ch. 81, no. 167, [1915] Wyo. Laws 81.
15 101 Colo. 564, 76 P.2d 420 (1937).
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substituted service."' 53 He then considered separately the question of
notice, dismissing Pennoyer with a judicial shrug:
That such substituted service may be wholly adequate to meet the re-
quirements of due process was recognized by this Court in Mc-
Donald v. Mabee..., despite earlier intimations to the contrary. See
Pennoyer v. Neff ... ; Burdick, Service as a Requirement of Due
Process in Actions in Personam, 20 Mich. L. Rev. 422. Its adequacy
so far as due process is concerned is dependent on whether or not the
form of substituted service provided for such cases and employed is
reasonably calculated to give him actual notice of the proceedings and
an opportunity to be heard.154
Thus Justice Douglas severed the questions of jurisdictional basis and
notice to the defendant and introduced a new method of analysis.
C. New Technique Applied to Corporate Problems
The two-factor technique was employed in International Shoe Co.
v. Washington.25 5 The defendant, a Delaware corporation, maintained,
during the years 1937-1940, as many as thirteen salesmen in Washington
State. The salesmen solicited and transmitted orders to defendant's prin-
cipal office in Missouri. Washington imposed its unemployment compen-
sation tax. The defendant contended throughout the subsequent ad-
ministrative and judicial proceedings that the state lacked jurisdiction to
tax. Counsel for the corporation argued specifically that service of the
notice of assessment by handing a copy to one of its salesmen in Wash-
ington and mailing a copy by registered mail to its principal office in St.
Louis was not effective.
justice Stone's opinion contained a thorough redefinition of the juris-
dictional basis required by the Constitution to call out-of-state corpora-
tions to defend actions in local courts. He wrote that a corporation must
have "certain minimum contacts""' with a state such that the demand
3311 U.S. at 462.
154Id. at 463 (citations omitted). Professor Burdick's article is particularly
informative as a statement of the law in this area as of 1922:
Attempts have repeatedly been made to take jurisdiction of non-resident
defendants through service by publication or through personal service made
outside of the State in which the action is brought. The Supreme Court
has held that such procedure does not give jurisdiction of the non-resident,
for a state cannot in that way extend its jurisdiction beyond its territorial
limits.
Burdick, Service As A Requirement of Due Process In Actions It Personat, 20
MIcH. L. REv. 422 (1922).
15326 U.S. 310 (1945).
'
5 8 Id. at 316.
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to come and defend does not offend "'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.' '157 This holding made the decision famous,"'
but here the significant aspect of the opinion is Justice Stone's treatment of
basis and notice as separate matters-just as the Court did in the Milliken
case. Justice Stone first discussed the issue of whether the proper relation-
ship existed between the defendant and Washington and then dealt sep-
arately with the sufficiency of notice. He wrote that "[i] t is enough that
appellant has established such contacts with the state that the particular
form of substituted service adopted there gives reasonable assurance that
the notice will be actual."' 59 Though there was service of process within
the state, Justice Stone nevertheless wrote that the Court could not say
"that the mailing of the notice of suit to appellant by registered mail at
its home office was not reasonably calculated to appraise appellant of the
suit."'
International Shoe was followed by new laws, popularly called long
arm statutes. The scheme of these acts reflects the analysis used in the
Milliken and International Shoe cases. Typically the statutes define in
detail a number of contacts or relationships with forum states and provide
that where any one of these contacts exists, there is a sufficient basis for
jurisdiction. In addition these statutes, either by their own terms or by
reference to more general statutes, provide for service of process outside
forum states by a variety of methods, usually including personal delivery,
mail, and any method allowed by states in which defendants are found.''
Illinois adopted the first comprehensive statute in 1955.12 A number
of jurisdictional relationships were defined by the act, which then pro-
vided: "[S]ervice of process upon any person who is subject to the juris-
diction of the courts of this State, as provided in this section, may be
made by personally serving the summons upon the defendant outside this
State."'03 The most sophisticated statute to date is the Uniform Interstate
1 7 Id.
"' See Developments in the Law--State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 -ARv. L. Ruv.
909, 923 (1960).
1'r 326 U.S. at 320.
... Id. In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), the only
attempt to serve the corporate defendant was by registered mail. The assertion of
jurisdiction by California was sustained and the opinion by Justice Black used a
two-factor analysis as a matter of course.
"I1 Developments in this area until 1963 are described in D. Currie, The Growth
of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL.
L.F. 533.
202 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1956).
11"Id. § 17(2). Reference is made to ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 16 (Smith-
Hurd 1956), which establishes the mechanics of out-of-state service of process.
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and International Procedure Act. The jurisdictional bases are broadly
stated,' and service of process outside the forum is specifically pro-
vided, 5 as in the Illinois act. Out-of-state service methods include per-
sonal delivery, delivery by any type of mail requiring a signed receipt,
as prescribed by the law of the place where service is made, as directed
by a foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory, and as directed
by a forum court.166 Any method used must be "reasonably calculated to
give actual notice,"'167 putting the statute squarely within the Milliken
standard. 6
At least thirty states have adopted long arm statutes. 6 These laws
vary somewhat in content, but there is every reason to believe that broad
statutes much like the Uniform Act will eventually be adopted by every
state. The interests of local plaintiffs and their lawyers virtually guaran-
tee this result.'70 The significance of these developments is clear. In
actions against foreign corporations where required jurisdictional bases
exist, it is not necessary to serve agents physically present within forum
jurisdictions. Under long arm statutes such as the Uniform Act, service
can be made outside states in a number of ways. Local agents, whether
individuals, corporations, or public officials, can be eliminated from the
procedure.
D. The Decline of Ultra Vires
Removal of the original purpose for requirements that local agents be
appointed is paralleled by a change related to requirements that foreign
corporations file copies of their charters. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins' 1
effectively did away with the void contract rule followed by the federal
courts. Furthermore, the law of most states underwent significant change,
104 UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT § 1.03.
265 Id. § 1.04.
120 Id. § 2.01.
1.. Id. § 2.01(a).
"' See p. 26 supra.
... The count in 1964 was 29. Note, The Virginia Long Arm Statute, 51 VA.
L. REv. 719 (1965). Georgia has acted since then. Act of March 10, 1966, no. 494,
[1966] Ga. Laws 342. Doubtless there are others.
... Recognition of the inevitable should not be mistaken for uncritical approval.
The need for restraint was recognized in Carrington & Martin, Substantive Itter-
ests and the Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66 MIcH. L. REv. 227 (1968), which sug-
gests the relevance of those interests in considering particular long arm applica-
tions. The technique is reminiscent of an early proposal that changed the choice
of law process. See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV.
L. REv. 173 (1933).
1'7304 U.S. 64 (1938). This decision eliminated application of federal com-
mercial law in diversity cases. See H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 610-36 (1953).
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primarily by adoption of legislation restricting the defense of ultra vires. 172
Vermont adopted the first of these acts in 1915,173 and since that time a
majority of states have adjusted the problem by statute.174 Typical is the
Illinois law,175 which provides that "[n]o act of a corporation . . . shall
be invalid by reason of the fact that the corporation was without capacity
or power to do such act .... -17' The Illinois act protects outsiders deal-
ing with corporations, essentially the same objective served by the filing
requirements. Statutes eliminating the defense are obviously more effec-
tive than charter filing requirements.
IV. PRINCIPLE OF CONDITIONAL ENTRY QUESTIONED
The joinder in Bank of Augusta v. Earle177 of the ideas that law can-
not operate beyond sovereign boundaries and that corporations are fiction-
al creatures of law forms the conceptual basis of foreign corporation laws.
The principle of conditional entry is laid on this foundation.
Traditional territorial notions are well shaken; further elaboration is
unnecessary to suggest that this part of -the foundation is eroded.'17 The
accuracy and utility of describing corporations as fictional creatures of
law has also come into question. Doubt was early expressed by Stewart
Kyd, who wrote in 1793 that "a corporation is as visible a body as an
army; for though the commission or authority be not seen by every one,
yet the body united by that authority is seen by all but the blind.' 7 9 Dur-
ing the nineteenth century the Supreme Court occasionally recognized
the difficulties of the fiction theory. In Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad,180 Justice Grier wrote of the idea that a corporation is an artifi-
cial person, but pointed out that "a citizen who has made a contract, and
has a 'controversy' with a corporation, may also say, with equal truth,
that he did not deal with a mere metaphysical abstraction, but with nat-
..2 For a description of the spread of this legislation to 1958, see Ham, Ultra
Vires Contracts Under Modern Corporate Legislation, 46 Ky. L.J. 215 (1958).
"" VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 133 (1958).
11, By 1956, 24 states had made some statutory modification of the ultra vires
doctrine. R. BAKER & W. CARY, CORPORATIONS 370 (3rd ed. unabr. 1959). Ap-
parently the current total is more than thirty-five. 1 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
200-01; Id. at 81 (Supp. 1966).
115 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.8 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
'
1 5 Id. But lack of capacity may be asserted in a proceeding by a shareholder
against a corporation to enjoin certain acts; in a proceeding by a corporation
against officers or directors for exceeding their authority; and in a proceeding by
the State to dissolve a corporation for transacting unauthorized business. Id.
1138 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
118 See pp. 3-4 supra.
1151 S. KYI, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 16 (1793).
15057 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853).
1968]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ural persons."' In 1911 Arthur W. Machen referred specifically to Chief
Justice Marshall's characterization in the Dartmouth College case,182 and
called it "untrue."' 83 He wrote that "a corporation exists as an objective-
ly real entity, which any well developed child or normal man must per-
ceive; the law merely recognizes and gives legal effect to the existence of
this entity.'*84 Philosopher John Dewey entered the lists in 1926 with
an article urging elimination of the idea of personality "until the concrete
facts and relations involved have been faced ... and stated on their own
account . .".1."'5 One year later a New York Supreme Court judge
eschewed both houses and wrote that a corporation is "more nearly a
method than a thing, and that the law in dealing with a corporation has
no need of defining it as a person or an entity, or even as an embodiment
of functions, rights and duties, but may treat it as a name for a useful and
usual collection of jural relations." 8 6
Without more, it is apparent that the formulations of Chief Justice
Marshall relied on by Justice Taney in the Bank of Augusta case have
been seriously questioned. This development, coupled with the bankruptcy
of territorial thinking, shows that the rationale of the principle of con-
ditional entry has disappeared.
CONCLUSION
The story of foreign corporation laws to date leads to two conclusions.
First, the original purpose of the fifty state laws has now largely passed
out of existence. Second, the operating principle of those laws is out-
dated, sustained by inertia but not by currently acceptable jurisprudence.
Should these troublesome regulatory schemes now be enforced by the
courts or conceded further life by the legislatures?
181 Id. at 327.
... See p. 9 supra.
"' Machen, Corporate Persoiality, 24 HARV. L. REv. 253, 260-61 (1911).
"'Id. at 261.
Devey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE
L.J. 655, 673 (1926).
" Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Pierson, 130 Misc. 110, 119, 222 N.Y.S. 532,
543-44 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
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